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00:00:00	 Gino Pasi: Today is Wednesday, September 26, 2007.  Today we will talk with 
Gavin Jenney who is currently the President of Dynamic Controls Incorporated.  
A company that for many years was the “in-house” contractor at Wright-Patterson 
Air Force Base directing research in the areas of flight control systems, including 
among many “fly-by-wire.”  This interview is being conducted in the studios of 
the Center for Teaching and Learning at Wright State University as part of the 
Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project.  The interviewer is Gino Pasi 
and as I said our interviewee today is Mr. Gavin Jenney.  Mr.Jenney, thank you 
for taking some time to be with us this afternoon.  
00:00:52 	 Gavin Jenney: You’re quite welcome. 
00:00:55 	 Pasi: If we could start, could you provide us with a brief synopsis of just some
biographical information:  where and when you were born; then maybe transition 
to your university education, and what might have prompted you to choose that 
particular path. 
00:01:13 	 Jenney: Alright, I’d be glad to.  Born in 1937, April 29th. The education: 
Lafayette College, a Bachelors in Mechanical Engineering;  University of 
Rochester, a Masters in Mechanical Engineering; Ohio State University, a Ph.D. 
in Engineering with an emphasis in control systems.  And then finally because I 
was at that time running a company, decided I’d better get an M.B.A.  So I have 
an M.B.A from Wright State University which I got after the Doctorate, which 
gives a different perspective.  It says there is a reason for engineering if you can 
sell it to somebody.  As far as why I got into doing aerospace, I started out right 
out of college working for General Dynamics Electronics up in Rochester, New 
York. I was interested in HiFi, but they didn’t have a job opening.  They had a 
job opening in military products.  I worked on several things at that point in time: 
a listening system for listening to—really—Russian radio transmissions, a wide 
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band [system]. One was installed in Turkey; one was installed in Germany.  But 
[it was] a big ear that was basically a monitoring station.  I then went into the 
Army; I was commissioned out of Lafayette as a Second Lieutenant in the Army 
Ordinance Corps.  [I] went back to General Dynamics Electronics and worked in 
hydro-acoustics. And then finally after three years there, and upon completion of 
my master’s degree in mechanical engineering, I decided since we didn’t have 
any children, my wife and I, we went to California to see what it was like.  My 
sister had gone there. Came back about a year and a half later after working in 
California for Hydraulic Research; [where I] invented a particular type of 
redundancy for flight control systems.   
Hydraulic Research was an aerospace company making hydraulic controls and I 
had worked in hydraulics at General Dynamics.  [I] got sent back to start a 
research contract for Hydraulic Research. I was supposed to be replaced after six 
[weeks] and my replacement quit.  He had just bought a four thousand foot square 
house and decided he didn’t want to come to the Midwest.   
00:03:35 Pasi: So that was here at Wright-Patterson 
00:03:37 Jenney: That was Wright-Patt on base. 
00:03:38 Pasi: Hydraulic Research had got a contract with the Air Force and—                    
00:03:42 Jenney: That’s correct.  And I was the local person at that point, having been 
there all of six weeks; so I’m still here.  So I stayed.  I hired some people from the 
area and we then entered a series of successive research and development 
contracts in flight controls.   
The emphasis at that time was to try to build up in-house research capability with 
the idea that the Air Force could benefit from having some hand’s-on experience 
in terms of hardware.  They were really trying to lead the manufacturing industry 
in terms of new technology.  So we ended up over a ten-year period that I worked 
for Hydraulic Research developing several things, some of which went into the— 
immediately into a application, the C-130 gunship.  We ended up developing a 
switching valve which solved a need that the gunship had for [surviving] small 
arms fire.  We ended up doing flow-difference sensors which are like your 
ground-fault interrupts for your electrical system in your bathroom.  You look at 
the fluid going out and the fluid coming back; if there’s a difference then you say 
“gee I’ve got a leak and I better shut down that branch.”  That got into the A-10 
for awhile “the Warthog;” proposed on the B-1, and the Fly-by-Wire, which was 
what I found very interesting.  But the Air Force was interested at that time in 
developing new techniques. It wasn’t necessarily a Cold War emphasis; it was 
just a better way of doing things that allowed increased capability from the fixed-
wing airplanes. 
 26 September 2007 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
00:05:42 Pasi: Would you say that there—I mean you mention the Cold War—was there 
an awareness on your part, or cognizance on your part, of this conflict that 
manifested itself in the job you did, or was it something you really never thought 
about it and you just had work to do and— 
00:05:59 Jenney: Yeah—never really thought about it.  It was—we were looking at what 
you need to do to control an airplane and how could that be improved.  And this 
idea of converting from mechanical couplings:  cables, linkages, rods, to an 
electrical control system made sense.  Because once you’ve gotten the electrical 
control system there’s so much more you can do with the handling qualities of the 
airplane, the guidance, compared to a mechanical system.  And true, you trade 
one set of problems for another. Mechanical systems are reliable, simple, straight-
forward. They’re not very flexible. And the ability to control the airplane is 
pretty much dependent on making the airplane very stable, very easy to control.  
Where if you have an electrical control system, then you can augment that 
control; you can add, and subtract, [to] the pilot’s inputs and you can make
airplanes that would be essentially un-flyable without augmentation quite easy to 
control. 
00:07:05 Pasi: And an example of an airplane that would be un-flyable with out the 
electrical—
00:07:09 Jenney: Oh, the 117, the stealth airplane; it has to be fly-by-wire.  The pilot 
couldn’t handle it if the fly-by-wire system wasn’t there.  It used F-16 ISAs the 
Integrated Servo Actuators.  It was built using those.  And the F-16 really is a—in 
some flight modes it would be very difficult to handle. It’s a “relaxed static-
stability,” meaning if you threw it into the air like you would an arrow, the arrow 
has feathers in the back, the mass on the front; it’s quite stable; it goes where it’s 
pointed. If you threw the arrow backwards with the feathers, you’ve got an 
unstable situation; it’ll start tumbling.  And that’s basically what an unstable 
aircraft does. But an unstable aircraft is very, very, maneuverable as long as you 
can catch it before it goes too far. So it’s a handling qualities [issue].    
00:08:03 Pasi: You mention the—I believe you mentioned the—A-10 as an early project 
that Hydraulic Research worked on. 
00:08:09 Jenney: Yeah 
00:08:10 Pasi: How would these ideas come to Hydraulic Research?  Would you—would 
Hydraulic Research, or Dynamic Controls, be doing research and bring these 
ideas to the Air Force, or would the Air Force bring you requirements and that 
would lead your research? 
00:08:26 Jenney: Sometimes it was a case of “here’s a problem;” how could you solve 
Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project Gavin D. Jenney 
that?  We did that on a couple of space [projects].  They were fly-by-wire related, 
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but not necessarily airplanes. We did this in terms of controlling large antennas in 
space; that was one of the projects we were involved with.  And it sort of came 
from one of the supervisors, you know it looks like there’s an area that needs to 
be improved and you go solve the problem.  In the case of the fly-by-wire, the 
project engineer, Vern Schmidt, who has since passed on, had a vision along with 
some other people of going to electrical flight control systems.  The airplanes in 
World War II and after, the B-47 for example, had some electrical systems; they 
weren’t very reliable. And this was the fundamental change that was needed to 
get acceptance for fly-by-wire systems.  You have to increase the reliability.  
There’s a “yaw damper” on the B-47; it was called “Little Herbie” because the 
Branch Chief that I worked with was instrumental in getting it started.  But it was 
a reliability problem; it was not reliable; it was turned off a lot of the time just 
because it wasn’t doing what it was supposed to.  With the advent of solid state 
electronics and later, advanced magnetics, it was now possible to make very 
simple and reliable electrical control systems, where that was not possible before.  
We always had the mechanical; you’d turn off the electrical [when] it didn’t do 
what it was supposed to. But the development of electronics enabled the 
transition to electrical flight control systems.  Now NASA had it for the Apollo 
program you know the Moon Lander: that was all electrical.  But the fixed-wing 
airplanes and long duration flights, long-term reliability wasn’t accepted by the 
Air Force. Along that same line and I’ll wander maybe a little bit, the role of the 
Air Force at that time was to actually develop a tech base; develop new 
technologies that could be an advantage if implemented into production airplanes.  
And quite often Wright Field would develop and then flight demonstrate.  This 
was the other thing; somebody’s got to fly it or nobody’s going to put it in an 
airplane, in a production airplane particularly.  So Wright Field would pursue 
technology that looked like they had a big payoff.  Develop them; fly them, and 
the next time a RFP for a production airplane came out they would ask “why not 
use this?” And they were really leading, at that point, the technology.  My 
suggestion is that I think that’s changed now.  I think the emphasis on inside 
research and internal research is diminished, the development of tech base where 
you’re developing technologies is now no longer a thrust.  And the procurement 
cycles have changed.  But back when we were doing the B-47 we were 
developing new technology. It was an exciting era and I was fortunate to be part 
of it. 
00:12:10 Pasi: Now as far as the laboratories are concerned, the Air Force has always had 
its own laboratories doing research.  Why was Dynamic Controls brought in as an 
in-house contractor?  Were the Air Force laboratories not equipped to do the kind 
of research and development that you guys were doing?
00:12:33 Jenney: Pretty much—that’s a good statement.  The people that were involved— 
that we were involved with—were involved in World War II and they did a lot of 
hands-on development by themselves trying to get quick solutions to problems 
that came out of World War II, and wanted to continue that mode of operation; 
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where you have hands-on you can innovate inside. But some of the new 
employees were primarily not technically oriented and the idea of having a 
contractor was the way to get it done.  So they sort of shopped the available 
suppliers of the technology and hired them for “in-house” operation.  We were 
there for more than thirty years, including Dynamic Controls and my period of 
time with Hydraulic Research.   
00:13:29 	 Pasi: Why “in-house;” I mean why not keep it somewhere else?
00:13:35 	 Jenney: Because in-house is a neutral and in fact we tested, and demonstrated, 
some of the products that other companies developed and they were submitted 
[by] a commercial company.  We weren’t a manufacturing company.  In-house 
also then avoids the coloration you’ll get in terms of how technology is presented 
to the Air Force. And it’s a very objective way of getting an honest look; does it 
have a payoff and will it work?  And you don’t necessarily get that same
perspective from a sales pitch; from a company coming in and saying “we’ve got 
a nice new widget that fixes everything.”  So “in-house” is a philosophy thing.  If 
you’re spending money and taxpayers’ money to buy something, but don’t have 
any personal experience with it, it’s very difficult to make a rational decision.  
And I’m interjecting a policy, or a philosophy, not a policy.  But that is indeed 
what many of the people we were associated with thought the value of having an 
in-house capability was. And if you can afford to do it, it’s a very good way of 
doing a sanity check and not that expensive.  We did the entire B-47 program, 
including modifying at the field, for—in 1966—for about a quarter-million 
dollars.  Now that would be a million dollar program, but compared to new 
airplane programs it was nothing.  We had the flexibility to move quickly and 
didn’t have a lot of the bureaucracy that you’ll have in a large company trying to 
do the same thing.   
00:15:27 	 Pasi: How was—you said it was easier to communicate ideas to the Air Force 
being in-house. What do you think was more important as the President of 
Dynamic Controls?  Is the analysis just as important as the communication and 
being able to sell those ideas?
00:15:55 	 Jenney: Probably. It’s—yeah—you certainly can have a great idea from an 
engineering standpoint, but if nobody understands that, or can appreciate it, and 
you can’t sell it then it’ll go nowhere. Some of the things that we did were 
innovative and in most cases we either flew them, or we at least put them in 
hardware form.  I’ll inject a philosophy statement; “hardware makes you honest.”  
You know you can have all the paper that you want, but if the hardware doesn’t 
work, it means nothing.  So the hardware is a good sanity check.  And that’s 
accepted. This is the same as flying; if you can build hardware that’ll fly, it’s 
accepted as a credible technology.  Plus it identifies things that you miss if you 
end up not adequately analyzing it. But [it is] the combination of analysis and 
having the Air Force buy off on the end products of those things that work well—
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and some of them did.  We did other activities as well in support of “fly-by-wire” 
that went into the F-16, the B-1, or B2, direct-drive-valves I mentioned to you the 
other day; that was a simpler way of doing fly-by-wire, which included using rare 
earth magnetic materials in a much simpler control system.  That’s on the tail 
surface of the F-22; it’s on the Gripen, JAS-39, a Swedish airplane; it’s in the B-2.  
And the technology was really developed at Wright Field; we flight tested it out at 
Edwards Air Force Base on an F-4 and gradually got it incorporated into a 
production airplanes. 
00:17:57 	 Pasi: I have in the research that I’ve done for this, there is mention of a 
“confidence gap” with fly-by-wire at first; would you say that the B-47 
diminished that gap to a certain extent, or diminished it completely to where the 
Air Force was ready accept it.  I guess—could you talk about the B-47 program?
00:18:21 	 Jenney: Yeah, it was a three phase program, and yes it really was designed to 
demonstrate and get Air Force confidence. And later on it went on to several of 
the commercial companies and that confidence got transitioned to them at the 
time.  [The] B-47 started in 1966 and we flew in early ’67; the program was over 
in December of ’69.  It was really three phases.  We took a B-47 airplane, which 
is a tandem pilot, co-pilot arrangement with a navigator, which is where I flew up 
in the front. [We] first modified the normal control column and we would 
transition to an electrical control for the pitch axis.  We ran several test-pilots 
through that.  We took data because we were trying model the dynamic response 
of the airplane. And they did touch-and-go landings with it in fly-by-wire.  We
set it up so that if the pilot pulled on the column it would transition back to the 
normal back-up system because we were non-redundant at that time.  But the 
principal advantage of that was it demonstrated how much tighter the control was 
using an electrical transmission [to] the backend of the airplane compared to the 
normal cable system.  Much more sensitive transients were.  Transient response 
from the airplane when you pulled back on the yoke was much, much, quicker.  
So there was a noticeable improvement just in the normal handling using an 
alternate method of transmitting the pilot’s signals back to [the] backend of the 
airplane. Phase two, we ended up putting in a side-stick controller.  It was
mounted over on the left-hand side of the cockpit; throttles were on the right.  So 
even though we had right-handed pilots, they were flying it with their left hand.  
Never got any complaints; you know “it’s on the wrong side.”  We also 
incorporated “pitch rate” and “normal acceleration.”  [Feedback,] the acceleration 
you felt on the seat of your pants [as] you pulled back on the stick [using] motion 
sensors on the airplane. And this changed the flight handling characteristics.  We
ran on Phase Two fifteen different test pilots through—got good ratings.  And it 
demonstrated the handling advantages and what you could do once you put a fly-
by-wire system in.  We still carried the mechanical backup along; we could still 
pull back on the column or we could turn it off with a switch.  But the ease of 
control was quite, quite an improvement.  To demonstrate that we put a camera in 
the front end of the airplane and that’s still there.  It stayed with the airplane even 
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after it was turned over to the museum.  And we put a camera [inside], where we 
could monitor the pilot’s control column motion as opposed to the side-stick.  
And we would go down over Kentucky about three hundred feet over the power 
lines and track the hills. The amount of control column movement when you 
were on side-stick was amazing, very rapid and large excursion with the pilot 
sitting there [with] very small motions—very easy to control the airplane.  And 
we got very good reviews from the test pilots.  There [was] a marked 
improvement in the handling qualities.  Phase Three addressed the reliability 
aspects of it. And we put in a quad-redundant system, meaning you could have a 
single failure in this electrical control chain; you can have a second failure, and 
you can have a third failure and then you fail safe.  But it was a fail operate, fail 
operate, fail safe—very effective demonstration of what could be done with 
redundancy. We would end up injecting and I was doing it; I was riding up in 
front of the airplane. I would inject hard-over failures in the pitch axis and as 
long as the airplane was flying level (we transferred within eight milliseconds) 
and you would feel nothing. If you’re pulling half gs—and it’s—the B-47 is not a 
high-g airplane; it’s a plus or minus one-g airplane—we would pull half-g turns 
and then you would feel a transient bump in that eight millisecond that occurred 
when [it] transferred from one channel to the other and eliminated what would 
have been a hard-over failure. 
00:23:09 	 Pasi: So during tests you were actually making things failure? 
00:23:12 	 Jenney: We were injecting failures; yeah I was injecting failures.  You don’t 
normally do that; you do it in simulators now, but I was doing it in flight, which— 
I was young and perhaps inexperienced, but it seemed like a logical thing to do at 
the time.  It would be considered “high-risk” at this point [laughs] if you were on 
new programs.  Yeah we flew for two years; put more than twenty pilots through 
it including the flight test pilots. We flew out of Area C, Bomber Ops, and [it was 
a] very effective program. The airplane is in the Air Force—or was in the Air 
Force Museum; it’s outside now, twenty-two eighty on the tail.  Still—you still 
can see the scoops that we put in to provide some cool[ing] for additional 
hydraulics to get the multiple channels and you can see the window up in front 
with the camera—behind which the camera was mounted.  No, a good program; it 
had the flexibility that we could do things very quickly.  Instead of procedures it 
was a case of being able to do what made sense.  I had told you about Major 
Scanlon’s view. Normally on a new aircraft program—I’ve worked other aircraft 
programs; it’s a tedious procedure to get anything to be allowed to fly.  Flight 
readiness reviews, the final checks; I’ve done that at NASA; I’ve done that stuff 
with the Air Force also, but the review on that [the B-47] was I had changed one 
of the quadrants on the back so that we could couple in a fly-by-wire actuator.  I 
had made it out of a better material than what Boeing had used on the original 
airplane. Theirs was a casting.  The Major, our test pilot, wanted to have it x-
rayed to make sure there were no voids in that casting.  So we—I—had it x-rayed 
and there were no voids in it. He looked at that.  And the other part of the review 
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was he asked me “will you fly with it?”  And I said “yes;” that was the end of the 
review. We could go fly.  And I did; I flew with it.  And I was very sure that it 
wasn’t going to have anything that I didn’t know about as a failure problem, but 
you can’t do that now. You don’t have that flexibility.  The risk—risk aversion 
and research has changed. 
00:25:36 Pasi: How did that review process end up being able to skirt the normal 
procedures? 
00:25:43 Jenney: They didn’t have [any] at this time.  We did this [also] on software; it 
was very similar.  There are hazards in all programs and as people lose airplanes 
or people particularly, they become risk averse.  And in this case it was done in 
house, the acceptance was by in-house Air Force people.  So we had flexibility, as 
opposed to an outside company operating at another facility for example would 
have to justify that they wanted to go fly a piece of Air Force property.  So the in-
house did really have a significant advantage from a flexibility standpoint.   
00:26:28 Pasi: You could cut out a lot of the—
00:26:29 Jenney: We could—we didn’t have to go through what are now a check and 
balance set up, and in many cases that wasn’t available.  People don’t put in 
checks until somebody screws up.  You have an accident and then now you 
suddenly become very concerned in preventing that type accident.  
00:26:44 Pasi: Why was the Stratojet, the B-47 chosen to— 
00:26:49 Jenney: Tandem airplane; there was an F-4 on an earlier program.  The pilot got 
lost. It was electrical; they were trying to do a high authority electrical system on 
it. And the characteristics on the F-4 is that you have about three hundred 
milliseconds, a third of a second, to catch the airplane and turn something off in 
the pitch axis if you have a hard-over failure, not long—the pilot can’t do it.  And 
they lost one; it over g’d, broke the airplane up, killed the pilot.  So the selection 
of the B-47s on the basis that it was a two-pilot, pilot and co-pilot, so that one 
could be a safety pilot and the second could monitor—could fly the airplane and 
the other individual could be the safety pilot monitoring what was going on.  So it 
was selected on that basis; you could have two people in it. 
00:27:49 Pasi: And did that close that “confidence gap?” Or would it take successive 
projects. 
00:27:56 Jenney: It took one more significant project, the—what happened at Wright Field 
after the B-47 was over, Honeywell was given a contract to modify the spoilers on 
a 141. And the idea was the B-47 was at the end of its useful life and they 
wanted to demonstrate fly-by-wire on another current airplane that had control 
Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project Gavin D. Jenney 
problems that could be improved if it was implemented.  It was a low budget 
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program, a quarter-million dollars at that time, and had some impact.  They 
demonstrated some control improvements; didn’t have the splash that was 
necessary to get a Prime to buy into the fly-by-wire.  So the Flight Dynamics Lab 
at that time funded McDonnell-Douglas to modify an F-4 airplane, a high speed 
fighter, current and make it a fly-by-wire.  It was sold on the basis of 
survivability; they were looking at F-4 losses in Vietnam and it—or-yeah, 
Vietnam, or it was Korea at the time.  But it had an impact in terms of being a 
current airplane and then the Primes were doing the modifications.  So they ended 
up working for about three years, but the program was on the order of twenty-
million dollars.  But McDonnell Douglas was being paid to be educated in terms 
of the fly-by-wire.  They unfortunately didn’t take advantage of that [(]until they 
got into the F-18[)] when they were bidding on the lightweight combat fighter, the 
F-17. They teamed with Northrop; it was a conventional push-rod and stability 
augmentation by small additional actuators.  Where General Dynamics on the YF-
16 went to full fly-by-wire and a relaxed static stability and the rest is history.  
They were very successful; there have been more than four thousand of them
made.  But the maneuverability available from the fly-by-wire was a big selling 
point. And they were quite successful.  When McDonnell Douglas, or the Navy 
needed a replacement for the F-4, the—at that time—McDonnell-Douglas Saint 
Louis came back and took the YF-17 platform that Northrop and they had 
developed, and it now became the F-18, which is fly-by-wire.  So they had 
demonstrated, they learned.  And that’s been the comments from many of the 
General Dynamics people, that the footwork was done by McDonnell Douglas 
people, but they themselves, General Dynamics, made the first use of it.   
00:30:59 	 Pasi: Now was that technology not fully developed at the time the F-15 was 
being developed? 
00:31:04 	 Jenney: That’s correct. No the F-15 is an augmented airplane, but it’s still 
mechanical controls with high-authority augmentation, but still not fly-by-wire.   
00:31:14 	 Pasi: And when you started work on the—was it the B-47 that you said had the 
yaw damper? 
00:31:22 	 Jenney: Yes, yeah. 
00:31:25 	 Pasi: Now was that an instance of the Air Force bringing you a problem and 
saying “can you fix this?” And your group saying “ooh, this is an opportunity to 
use some of this fly-by-wire technology?” 
00:31:38 	 Jenney: No, I think the reason why I gave that example is that the Air Force’s 
confidence in electronic control systems was not very great because of reliability 
problems and as an example was the yaw damper.  For example the B-52s are 
mechanical, simple, and they’re still flying.  But they actually did a retrograde 
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from the B-47 in terms off the augmenting the airplane.  It’s a very stable
airplane, but it’s mechanical controls.  It wasn’t an advanced control system in 
terms of boosting; it’s a very simple—rudimentary, push-rods, linkages, cables— 
a long ways from fly-by-wire.  And it was because of some of the experience they 
had with moving into electronics.  In what really was the “tube era,” it was the 
electronic tubes that [were] the method of amplification.  When I started with 
Hydraulic Research in about 1963, Analog Devices had developed their first 
operational amp, solid state amplifier that didn’t drift.  And that was a two-
hundred dollar part, about two inches long, one and a half inches wide, and an 
inch high in a little encapsulated [block].  You can buy that same part for about 
seventy-nine cents now. It’s something it does functionally and it’s a thirtieth of
the size and weight, and very reliable. But the solid state electronics was a great 
[enabler] for putting in electronic control systems in airplanes.  The reliability you 
can get out of solid state electronics, maintainability, the whole thing, volume and 
size was greatly enhanced by the development of solid-state electronics which 
was also started right in this—1960, 1965 era.   
00:33:39 	 Pasi: You talked about doing work with NASA  
00:33:43 	 Jenney: uh huh. 
00:33:44 	 Pasi: And you’ve done a lot of work NASA, is that safe to say?
00:33:48 	 Jenney: We did an F-18 program called EPAD, which was a joint Air Force, 
Navy, and NASA Dryden, this is the flight-test center out at Dryden, where we 
demonstrated a power-by-wire.  It’s still fly-by-wire system, but the idea that 
you’re not using hydraulics anymore in the actuators, or at least a central 
hydraulic system. We demonstrated that on an F-18 in the aileron position over a 
period of—well it was—ten years of 1990 to almost the year 2000.  Put in almost 
three different systems.  Yes in that case it was primarily us interfacing between 
the normal flight control system.  We put in additional computers.  This was the— 
although we’d messed with the hydraulics and the fundamental electronics—this 
was looking at the interface of this test hardware with the F-18 airplane.  And we 
ended up putting in additional computers that fooled the normal flight control 
computers to thinking they had a standard actuator and test sequence on it; created 
the command signals for the test hardware and handled all the redundancy 
management fault identification shutting down the system.  The first program on 
that was a fly-by-light. We were using optical signals to fly the airplane on these.  
The second two systems were an electro-mechanical actuator which is motor 
driven and [uses] gear box.  And the third was an electro-hydro-static where the 
transmission of motor motion to actuator motion is a hydraulic pump.  [It is] 
accomplishing the same thing just as a transmission, but it’s all local; there’s no 
central hydraulics. Worked very well.  I also worked the X-37 program which was 
a lifting body program.  More recently the X-43 hyper-sonic program, we were 
involved as really technical consultants to NASA Dryden on a “sanity check” 
 26 September 2007 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
basis on the primary flight-control system on the research vehicle.  Then later 
when the first launched—the Pegasus missile—the fins came off.  And there was 
a two-year activity of “why did that happen and what are we going to do to do 
that” and we were part of the team of Parker Orbital Science who provides the 
Pegasus, Dryden, and ourselves on fixing that problem.  And then the second 
flight, Mach seven and the last flight Mach ten were quite successful, so—quite 
interesting hyper-sonic program, so—  
00:36:39 Pasi: These were all—I guess the “X” denotes experimental?   
00:36:43 Jenney: Experimental and— 
00:36:44 Pasi: Now from 1957 when the Soviets launched Sputnik and we, you know, 
entered into this “space race” with the Soviets, did NASA really drive the fly-by-
wire research at that point. 
00:37:00 Jenney: They did initially; they didn’t do it for fixed-wing airplanes.  But it’s the 
only thing that made sense for spacecraft.  It’s a different control technology.  
You’re using reaction jets in terms of maneuvering spacecraft, but it’s done 
electrically, bang-bang control, solenoids; you eject the gas and that rotates the 
vehicle. They didn’t transition that into fly-by-[wire;] they didn’t transition that 
technology until after the B-47 program.  This was in the late seventies when 
there was a DIGITAC Program started by NASA.  I also thought that—you 
know—basically you look at whatever other people are doing and can you make it 
the next incremental step?  They initially tried applying the Apollo 13-bit flight 
control computer on it and found that the there was a tendency of the airplane—it 
was on a F-8 airplane—and the tendency of the airplane was to fly digitally also.  
It was a—you could feel the steps in the resolution of the commands; it was 
limited really by the number of bits that were being used.  And they later went on 
and improved that, but NASA did a digital fly-by-wire flight control system.  And 
it took a little longer. Sequentially it was you know we started it with the B-47, 
and then NASA did a DIGITAC Program.  The Air Force funded McDonnell-
Douglas to implement, and then fly, and then demonstrate, and it got good 
reviews. The F-4 680J program produced an airplane which is now in the Air 
Force Museum; it’s in the research building.  It’s been saved. And it was the first 
fly-by-wire fighter that the Air Force had flown.   
00:39:05 Pasi: To bring this back to the Soviets, and in our recent meetings you showed 
me some information about what the Soviet’s were doing in fly-by-wire.  Was 
that intelligence made available to you?  Were you learning anything from the 
Soviets, or did that never play a role. 
00:39:29 Jenney: It never played a role.  It never played a role.  The Soviets, and again I 
didn’t know until 2003 when one of the presentations was by a professor from
Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project Gavin D. Jenney 
Moscow University, Alexander Efremov, what the status of the Soviets—and in 
 26 September 2007 12 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project 	 Gavin D. Jenney 
fact until the Cold War—after the Cold War.  It meant there were many things in 
the Soviet technology that we were not aware of.  But they started their first 
experimental flight on a SU-24, Sukoi-24, in 1970.  This was a year after we had 
done something; we had finished up the B-47 program.  The next one was in 1977 
which was a Su-27, and that uses an analog quad system.  I’ve had some exposure 
to that, so I familiar of how it was implemented—all analog, but fully fly-by-wire.  
So the Soviets sort of did a “me too.”  But like many things, they observed what 
other countries were doing and if the technology seems reasonable they try 
incorporating it. And of course the biggest example of a transition if you look at 
the TU-144 and the Concorde; they’re very similar airplanes.  The French may 
have collaborated or at least the information of the French design for the 
Concorde was available to the Russians, and so the TU-144 is a knock-off.  There 
are other Russian airplanes that were knock-offs of the swing-wing F-111.  One of 
the Russian airplanes is very similar.  But they weren’t leading the technology at 
that point.   
00:41:32 	 Pasi: As far as research and development was concerned during the Cold War 
and even today, the research and development resulted in advances across a broad 
spectrum of technologies, especially during the Cold War.  In your judgment, 
what technologies resulted in a significant benefit for the United States Air Force?
And obviously it’s fine if you’re biased.  That’s totally acceptable for whatever 
your answer is. 
00:42:08 	 Jenney: Ok. [Laughs] No I thought the advances in the control systems, the 
ability to fly an airplane and actually in terms of missile delivery.  From an
advantage our ability to control and deliver weapons were a main payoff, and in 
projects—even in the fly-by-wire; I view it as an enabling technology.  I’ve 
mentioned to you before; if you buy a new car right now, typically you’ll have a 
throttle-by-wire. And this is very similar to what we were doing with the B-47.  
Throttle-by-wire, you’re not connected to anything except a potentiometer which 
develops a voltage saying “this is the operator’s [input]; this is the operator’s 
throttle position.” It’s used then as part of a control system for the engine which 
looks at whether the wheels are spinning, you back off the throttle, or you back 
off the input that the driver is putting in.  When you do that same sort of thing and 
put an electrical control system in an airplane, then you now can modify the 
pilot’s input to both stabilize the airplane, to perhaps give him better guidance; 
you could change the handling qualities. In fact one of the better examples of that 
is the Airbus, the Airbus 320, 340, 380 series.  They’re all using basically the 
same flight control system.  And the advantage on that is if you now feed the 
motion of the airplane back so that the pilot is now commanding how the nose 
goes up and down, or what he feels on the seat of his pants.  Its CSTAR or its 
mix—and we flew that on the B-47 back in 1968 and demonstrated that we could 
make a better handling airplane out of it.  Airbus has picked up on it; the 777 does 
that; uses that same technology, that type of feedback where you’re now 
commanding aircraft motion. The surface position will go wherever it’s needed 
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to get the motion of the airplane. When you do that you can take a smaller 
airplane and make it fly just like—or a larger airplane, and make it fly just like a 
smaller airplane, because what you’re doing is commanding motion of the 
airplane. You couldn’t do that mechanically.  Every airplane would go—every 
airplane you get in would handle differently, and the pilot’s would have to cross-
train. But Airbus has very effectively used fly-by-wire to minimize the training 
time for pilots flying the different airplanes.  They all fly very similarly; they use 
the same controls.  And that’s a great advantage.  So the flexibility that you get 
once you put in a fly-by-wire system: you can stabilize the airplane; you can 
make the airplane unstable, that dart-stability that I was talking about.  And it’s a 
great advantage to be able to augment what the pilot’s doing. Pilot’s good for low 
frequency stuff or long term things.  He’s not—an individual—the human does 
not have high-frequency response capability or instance response and you can get 
that by using electronic sensors to add to what the pilot’s doing when flying the 
airplane.  But I think that and then our ability to generate high performance 
airplanes the F-15, the RB-70 although there are only two copies made, one was 
lost during a photo shoot for General Electric Engines.  But the RB-70 was 
stopped primarily as a Cold War “give up” that “we won’t do this if [you] stop 
producing that,” but that was a 1970 airplane and a Mach 3 airplane.  The T-4, I 
think TA-4, or SA-4, anyway the Russians built five competitors of that also 
Mach 3. It had a droop snoot on it and when it would come up in a flight it would 
be flying on a cathode ray tube. They [were] made as a direct—in direct— 
competition to our B-70, Mach three so that the F-15 would have a hard time
getting it at high altitude.  So propulsion and aerodynamics and the ability to 
control I think are probably the most three significant things.    
00:46:47 	 Pasi: You say an enabling technology; it has also enabled the possibility of 
stealth and flying wing aircraft obviously.   
00:46:56 	 Jenney: Oh yeah. You can now—you can take a brick and make it fly 
acceptably. [Laughs] It’s aerodynamically horrible, but it’s good for radar 
avoidance. And the 117 is a classic example; it’s not flyable without the-without 
fly-by-wire. 
00:47:23 	 Pasi: I would like to touch on this a little bit, because I believe you mentioned it 
earlier; you talked about—I believe it might have been—the F-4 in Vietnam.  
How did that conflict affect the technology that you worked on, if at all?
00:47:38 	 Jenney: Ok, Ok, no it did. We were given a problem that they were losing a lot 
of F-4s. The F-4s used three hydraulic systems:  a utility system to put the 
landing gear down, and then a primary—two more primary systems which were 
used on the tail surface and on the wings.  It was plumbed through the wings and 
I’ve seen both pictures and cutaways, a lot of plumbing, very convoluted, pretty 
dense and it was very susceptible to ground fire.  And if they would take a single 
hit through the wing of an F-4 from ground fire, the probability of losing both 
 26 September 2007 14 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project 	 Gavin D. Jenney 
hydraulic systems, and then the airplane, were very probably.  They did lose a lot 
of F-4s. We were asked to look at what could we do on a leak detection to stop 
that. And then we developed a flow difference sensor and actually flew it over in 
Area C. And the pilot put a dump valve in the hydraulic system and it did indeed 
shut down; you lost less than a pint and a half of oil in that detection system.  And 
then that was promoted for the A-10 later.  And then our design went directly to 
Hydraulic Research; I was still working for them at that time.  And they made 
some for the A-10.  The transition on the F-4 though was not to that; McDonnell-
Douglas re-plumbed the airplane and had a simpler solution; they put a utility 
system in the wing.  So now if you had the single shot you’d still have one 
hydraulic system left that you could fly the airplane with.  And I don’t disagree 
with it; it was a good way of doing it and it saved an awful lot of the F-4s. So 
from that standpoint we occasionally would answer a pressing problem that was 
presented by the users in terms of something they needed to have solved.  That 
gunship problem was a very similar thing; they needed an additional hydraulic 
system because they could lose a line from ground fire.  We developed a 
switching valve and that went directly from the laboratory to Hydraulic Research, 
and then into the airplanes.  It’s a case where, and certainly in a wartime 
environment, there’s a lot more pressure to solve problems quickly and the time to 
do that, to implement a solution, is much—much—shorter than it would be in a 
peace time.   
00:50:35 	 Pasi: Does that cut out some of those procedural steps as well during wartime? 
00:50:39 	 Jenney: Oh yes, oh yes, yeah. Yeah. The special project office for the C-130 
came up, one of the engineers, and said “that’s something I can use, can I get 
more of them?”  [Laughs] And so we sent the drawing off to Hydraulic Research 
and they made them, and he got more of them.  And that was it. And he put it in. 
We had tested enough in the lab where it looked like it worked and it went in, and 
it did work. So yeah innovation is quite often very responsive if the problem is 
quite pressing, and you can do things quickly. Then the tedious and perhaps 
overly long process for buying new technology is circumvented. 
00:51:28 	 Pasi: Even and I guess during the Cold War there wasn’t really a peace time, but 
you say that they would press you for answers more say during Vietnam or for 
solutions to problems.  Would that pressure to produce also be as there say during 
the post-Vietnam era, the pressure to produce and for dramatic breakthrough in 
what you’re doing?
00:51:55 	 Jenney: No our role at Wright Field was primarily to provide tech-based stuff.  
When a problem would come up then we would solve that and then we’d go back 
to looking at things that could be used long term.  So it was a tradeoff between 
solving a short-term problem that we could do and then developing long-term
solutions. The direct-drive-valve for example was something we worked on for 
maybe over two or three year period because that was something that seemed 
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logical. It simplified the parts count on a fly-by-wire system; it could be made 
smaller and eventually it got—it transitioned into a production airplane.  So our 
short-term solutions were really depending on what came up, losing a lot of 
airplanes. We looked at some other problems; F-111s for example, not a fly-by-
wire airplane, but they were losing F-111 because the valves were jamming in the 
actuator, so we ended up setting up a test set-up to side load the actuators, and 
these are big tail surface actuators that had an overhaul problem; they were losing 
airplanes after the actuators got overhauled.  And we were asked to look at that 
and did do testing, and contributed to the final solution.  So if the problem was 
urgent then the research could be pointed in that direction.   
00:53:31 Pasi: As a contractor on-site at Wright-Patterson you’re kind of different from
many of the other interviewees that we have had— 
00:53:40 Jenney: [laughs] 
00:53:40 Pasi: The rest have been civilian employees there.  They’ve all mentioned that at 
times whenever there was even the slightest change in leadership anywhere, at 
Wright-Patterson, or even up to the Department of Defense, or congressional, or 
even executive levels, there would be hiccups in what they were doing.  Did you 
experience any of that as an independent contractor on base? 
00:54:07 Jenney: Only from the standpoint of the annual problem of funding.  We’re a 
contractor; our contracts varied from one year initially, to three years, to five 
years, but they’re only funded for one year.  And so each year you have to go 
back and justify “are we going to continue to fund at the original budgeted level?”  
And so yeah, there was a “hiccups” in terms of funding.  My observation in the 
late nineties and the early two-thousand was that the budget problems became a 
driver for reorganization.  And the problem that you’d have with getting annual 
funds—we actually at one point because of the cut back in the funding were zero 
funded. I had enough backlog that we could survive the year. But we were the 
only contractor within the organization associated with it that still had any 
existence. Many of the other ones got shut down.  It‘s a case of “where does the 
money go?”  Does it go R & D, or does it go short-term problems, war—R & D is 
a long-term thing, so we’ll take money from that and solve an immediate—Bosnia 
for example, funding that.  It’s a budgetary issue.  I think in many cases that’s not 
uncommon. It occurs with all organizations:  “Where are you spending your 
money; we don’t have enough and what are you going to do with it?”    
00:55:54 Pasi: It makes the world go around. 
00:55:55 Jenney: [laughs] Yes, Yes. 
00:55:57 Pasi: I’d like to maybe hear more about the funding and how some projects get 
Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project Gavin D. Jenney 
funded and others don’t, but this might be a good time to take a break and we’ll 
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pick up again in just a minute. 
00:56:10 Jenney: That sounds fine. 
End of Video Tape 1 
Start of Video Tape 2 
00:00:00 	 Pasi: Again today is September 26th 2007; we are talking with Gavin Jenney as 
part of the Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project.  Mr. Jenney when 
we last left off you were discussing one of the major obstacles in what you do is 
receiving the funding, or major, I think, hiccups to programs we were talking 
about. You mentioned that funding is always an issue.  How do you, or how do 
the powers that be, decide on what is getting funded; what is being cont—what 
is—what they will continue funding on?  I will assume that is another necessity 
based decision? 
00:00:52 	 Jenney: Pretty much and again it’s been an observation both being—observing 
what gets funded and being the recipient of some, and not getting funding for 
some of the activities.  There was a big change at the end of the Cold War; up to 
that point in time, if you had a reasonable idea you could promote it, and in most 
cases money was plentiful; it wasn’t an issue.  Soon as the Cold War ended, then 
this idea of “what are we going to be doing,” this idea of having internal research 
became a problem with Wright Labs; this is again my observations.  The primes 
suddenly found that their monies were drying up for research and then were 
feeding back into the administration in Washington that “boy we need more 
money in order to keep our research going to develop new things.”  And the Air 
Force was giving less and less money to research and Wright Labs became a 
direct recipient of that fund reduction.  At one point the money that they had was 
just adequate to fund the civil servants that were working in several, many, of the 
divisions, and [there was] no money for passing on to the primes, or even having 
in-house work. So for about a year there was a reorganization and a reduction in 
the personnel of the civil service part of the Air Force at Wright Field.  We were 
zero funded for our activity.  At that time we were also being funded by NASA 
and some activities in Area C, for what used to be Foreign Technology Division.  
And so it didn’t directly affect us.  But many of the other contractors that were 
 26 September 2007 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project 	 Gavin D. Jenney 
supporting the divisions that we were working with were zero funded and went 
elsewhere. So that was the immediate impact; it also caused a reduction in 
personnel at Wright Field in the research area and eliminated a lot of internal 
capability which the Air Force could no longer afford to support.   
00:03:26	 Pasi: I’m sorry, did you say “long-term capability?” 
00:03:30 	 Jenney: Yes, people that had been there—experienced—there were people that 
we would work with that were given early retirement.  And that capability and 
that experience was lost.  The other aspect of that is part of that over the years the 
hiring had not been sufficient to bring in new people, to gradually attain the 
experience that was needed from the people retiring, and suddenly we have a gap 
of maybe a twenty year period which people that were supposed to be working in 
a technology, were never hired; people that were retiring, and it was a capability 
gap. Certainly the procurement and the monitoring functions, the SPOS, the 
Special Project Offices, the things that are necessary to fund the primes were 
maintained, but the research activities were greatly cut back.  In addition at that 
time there was a change to what’s called a “prime spec,” which many of the 
people that I worked with didn’t like, where instead of putting out a request for 
producing a new airplane based on a series of specifications on how to build it in 
terms—and it the specifications were really based on experience [and] were well-
founded—the specification now became a prime spec where the performance of 
the airplane, and the cost, and the reliability were specified but not how you 
would do it. And the specs became references, but no longer requirements.  And 
this was an economic decision because the many of the programs had been funded 
based on a particular price estimate by the primes but as soon as the requirements 
changed the Air Force would get dinged for that change realizing what they had 
specified in terms of how to do things wasn’t going to produce what they wanted 
as an end product. So that change to the prime spec was one way of avoiding it 
and those cost over-runs that were associated with the perfect hindsight, knowing 
that you’d miss something in terms of how you specified the airplane to be built.  
The change also was not producing tech-base projects anymore.  Developing a 
new technology which looked like it would logically go into a new airplane, it 
would give an advantage, was not being funded for research anymore.  It was 
being—that responsibility was being dumped into the prime spec.  So from a 
funding standpoint our program changed in a particularly—well I’ll give you a 
good example.  Most of the research projects that we were funded with ended up 
with a final report which documented what we did, what the results were, and 
they were widely distributed to any technical organization that dealt with the 
government.  It was a passing on of that information so that they would have it.  
With the last cut-back in the funding, the TRs, or Technical Reports were no 
longer being produced. That was an economy thing.  They were no longer being 
produced in hard-copy and then they eventually went to disks to save money, 
black and white instead of color.  But it was an economy move.  So it, yeah, 
funding did really hurt the research. The other activity as I said that the Air Force 
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and Defense Department was involved with in terms of overseas—Bosnia and 
certainly Iraq—that all cost money, and the logical place to get it with a fixed 
budget is you pull it out of the projects that have long term payoff, but not short 
term.  So yeah, we saw that. To give you an example, our budget and that we 
were pretty much always a percentage of the budget for research that the labs had.  
We would have maybe twenty percent of their “out-house,” I’ll call it “out-
house,” funding that was outside. We would have twenty maybe thirty percent of 
that and that started out they’d maybe have four million dollars, and the next year
they’ve got three, two, and pretty soon one million.  And pretty soon, there was 
none—you know—we were fighting very diligently with competing projects to 
get funding. And it was a year by year deal.  It wasn’t ”you have a five year 
contract,” but that didn’t mean you make it to the end of five years if it wasn’t 
funded. So that changed the role of the Air Force though I think in many areas 
from leaders to monitors.  They could generate requirements, but not how to do it 
and didn’t understand whether the requirements could be met by the technology 
that was available. So some planes then took much longer.  The F-22 was in very 
long development.  It started out as an ATF, but a very long process to develop.  
It’s finally active as a squadron now; just this year the first squadrons are going 
out. But the other aspect of that is that originally four hundred were going to be 
purchased, we’re down to one hundred and eighty-three.  The Air Force would 
like more, but they’re competing with other services; the Navy wants F-18 Es and 
Fs. There’s not enough money to buy everything that people want.  Then some
programs, [like] the V-22 the Marines wanted and Special Forces; the Air Force 
didn’t want and politically it’s managed to survive.  Some of the helicopters, the 
Cheyenne, from the Army, they just killed the program.  I was involved with 
NASA; NASA had the same budget problems.  At NASA, the X43-C which was 
supposed to be “hydrocarbon follow-on” got cancelled.  The “money-eater” on 
that wasn’t war; it was the space station and the space shuttle expenses.  The 
budget got consumed by other things and then research suffers.  So I mean it’s not 
unique to the Air Force; it’s a common problem, not enough beans to go around.   
00:10:42 	 Pasi: I’m not sure how I want to phrase this question then, but technology and 
those people who create it, foster it, nurture it, the engineers really behind these 
technologies, that has been hit hard with the ending of the Cold War, that the Air 
Force has lost a certain knowledge base there?  Is that what I’m hearing or no?
00:11:15 	 Jenney: Yeah, I believe so; I think that—I don’t think my comment is that that’s 
unique. If you retire fifty percent of the people that have been working in an area, 
then you’ve lost that experience base and lost that capability.  So it’s a—in terms 
of doing internal research, in terms of developing things, and if the technology 
development is now transferred to the private sector through primes—and we’ve 
lost primes also—we’re down to essentially Boeing and Lockheed as being the 
two suppliers of military airplanes now.  So yes, we’ve shrunk from basically five 
suppliers down to two, again because of the funding available to do that.  And the 
research in the Air Force has also gone down, at least proportionately to what 
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we’ve seen in the aerospace industry, military aerospace industry.  You see this 
even in the parts supply, the ability to buy hardware for military, and the military 
hardware has to be more rugged than the commercial.  But there’s very little 
interest in many of the electronic producers for components to producing anything 
that would be qualified on a military airplane.  The market isn’t there; they don’t 
have enough buy in to justify that. And the qualification is no longer, in many 
cases, being done by the suppliers. You’ll buy commercial products, and then 
you ring them out; you do the screening; you do the testing and then put them in a 
device. So instead of having a sample of qualified parts, you don’t.  The 
manufactures of the end product are having to qualify, and it’s expensive.  The 
parts are only used by them and they’re not general market parts, so it’s a change.  
So the volume of the military spending in the electronics area and the new
technology area is—it’s in many cases a using of the commercial parts; “leap 
frogging” off the availability of the commercial parts to incorporate them in the 
military.  Perhaps one other thing that’s happened since the end of the Cold War, 
we have a great concern about loss of life in the ground—foot soldiers as well as 
the Air Force. We were quite successful in Iraq in terms of military success and 
minimizing loss of life, and that’s now become an expectation.  So the idea of 
putting pilots in airplanes is becoming less popular.  And it’s developed a whole 
new technology in terms of uninhabited airplanes, whether combat or just 
observation. So we now have what used to be Drones flying and they’re flying 
with fly-by-wire. You know it’s been an enabling technology for that.  It’s 
certainly electrically controlled and so there has been research in that particular 
area, primarily for observation and more recently for actual weapons delivery, 
The Predator, one of the Predators, is carrying Tow missiles—is a good example 
of that.  So [are] electronics in that area, but we’re almost to the point that our 
enemy is going to be a computer operator.  We have our computer and we’re 
going to be playing computer games without loss of a human life.  Right now the 
internal research within the Air Force, which is where your question was 
directed—I think, yes, certainly the knowledge that was gained from World War 
II to the end of the Cold War has now been greatly reduced.   
00:15:38 	 Pasi: With that reduced capacity in the Air Force as far as technology is 
concerned, it seems that during the Cold War with private contractors, and the 
laboratories and engineers working at Wright Field that there was almost a system
of checks and balances, or that there was a kind of shared goal.  Now as more 
things are contracted out, are there still those checks and balances, or can 
contractors pretty much run the show to a certain extent?
00:16:15 	 Jenney: I think the contractors do once they have a contract.  There is certainly 
pressure to stay within budget and be on schedule.  But in terms of what’s done 
technically within it, they can do what they want.  And in some cases it works; 
some cases it doesn’t.  There’s a supposedly a criteria to meet the performance 
requirements of a prime contract.  You’ve got to do—you’ve got to be able to 
have the sorties; you’ve got to have the mean time between failures; you’ve got to 
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have the performance that the contracted.  What the contractor does is a not 
common knowledge and certainly it’s proprietary; we’re down to two 
competitors.  And so much of their internal developments are not common 
knowledge, where the technology which was being developed by the Air Force, 
being paid for by the Air Force, was handed out to everybody.  Everybody could 
use it if there was an advantage.  So the few primes, or few large companies, that 
are funded to do things, they learn and get the experience, but it doesn’t go to 
anybody else. It doesn’t transfer. So the industry as a whole—my feeling is that 
the industry as a whole—doesn’t advance nearly as quickly as when the Air Force 
was doing things and moving the technology forward.   
00:17:55 	 Pasi: How would you estimate Wright Field’s significance during the Cold War 
years, nineteen forty-five to the early nineties, nineteen ninety-two? 
00:18:08 	 Jenney: That’s a yeah—since I wasn’t directly involved with the interface
between the using organization—but I think what happened on the technology 
front in terms of the Air Force, and it was Air Force, Army, and Navy, is that we 
were developing weapon systems faster than the other fellows, the Cold—you 
know the Soviets. And eventually we did indeed—this was Reagan’s, I think, 
vision—we did outspend them.  They couldn’t afford to keep developing things as 
quickly and finally realized that. I thought it was a good philosophy. So the 
money we were putting into defense—and some of the stuff, certainly the Star 
Wars, was a little bit of wishful thinking; it wasn’t practical, but the Soviets didn’t 
know that—and the idea that we were spending was a threat to them and they 
finally economically decided “boy this isn’t going to work.”  So, technology had a 
major effect in ending the Cold War.  We were developing things faster; we were 
much better in terms of developing electronics and computers.  They were well 
behind us and they still are in terms of electronics.  So the things we could do 
with electronics, both in listening and in control, and in weapons delivery, were 
more advanced than what they were doing.  They were good in terms of 
mechanical hardware, non-computer driven devices.  But in some areas we were 
much better. And I think the Wright Field push in terms of technology was a 
major part of that.   
00:20:09 	 Pasi: You said “they still are behind us in electronics.” Looking toward the 
future, do we still concern ourselves with what the Soviets are doing?  And you 
might not even have an opinion on this but—  
00:20:24 	 Jenney: No I’ve got an opinion.  If you look at what China’s buying, [Laughs] 
they’re buying Su-27s; they’re buying the manufacturing rights; they’re buying 
the Su-33, fly-by-wire airplane, quite a competent fighter—as I said, I’ve had 
some exposure to that—and the missile systems.  China has enough money; 
Russia needs money.  And the aerospace industry in Russia at the end of the Cold 
War, they were also—you know—funding was cut for them too.  They had a hard 
time surviving.  I think the Chinese certainly as a world power are getting an 
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awful lot from what used to be our adversaries in the Cold War.  The technology 
of the era that they’re able to buy and then learn, and then manufacture their own 
is I think significant.  They’ve got their own astronaut space program.  Again, it’s 
a—they’re building ships; they’ll have a larger Navy than we will pretty quickly.  
So it’s a case of the knowledge is available; if it’s developed by somebody else 
they’ll buy it; we won’t be selling it to them, but they can buy it elsewhere.  But 
those developments that the Soviet Bloc made during the Cold War are 
transitioning into the next big Gorilla on the tree. [Laughs]   
00:21:59 Pasi: That’s a sobering realization too that the research that was being done 
during the Cold War still has reverberations today—  
00:22:06 Jenney: Oh yes. 
00:22:07 Pasi: —as you said for the new kid on the block here. 
00:22:09 Jenney: yeah. 
00:22:11 Pasi: Well Mr. Jenney as we move toward closing, I’d like to give you the 
opportunity to feel free to discuss whatever you think we might have missed 
today or any topic that— 
00:22:20 Jenney: You’re going to make this truly extemporaneous, ok. 
00:22:24 Pasi: Well, I mean, you know the weather, or the Yankees, might not be apropos, 
but— 
00:22:28 Jenney: No I think the military research was—and I’ve enjoyed it; I did it for 
more than thirty years—had a tremendous payoff in terms of even the commercial 
areas. Things that are developed under the military and NASA will make the 
same claim.  The fly-by-wire, it did transition finally first to the French on the 
Airbus, and the 777 has a fly-by-wire, not with side-stick; they wanted to keep the 
control column in the middle, like we had on the B-47 on the first phase.  So they 
kept the control column and the yoke on the 777 because it was an easy transition 
for other airlines to go from one Boeing airplane to the other.  They all had 
control columns and yoke. Well Airbus did the side-stick which I think makes a 
lot more sense, but yeah it’s transitioned.  That and you’ll see a lot of general 
aviation regional jets going to fly-by-wire.  Some of the Embry Air is looking at 
producing one. But fly-by-wire, the glass cockpits, all that is transitioned into the 
commercial air and that is the next development for fly-by-wire, is the application 
into the commercial areas.  Certainly it’s gone into the UAVS, the control 
techniques for those. The other things that you’d end up doing with jet engines; 
we’re making jet engines more efficient for military; we make them more 
efficient for commercial because of gas.  Alternate fuel techniques, the military 
Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project Gavin D. Jenney 
has the same problem with gasoline; fuel costs money.  They’re looking at putting 
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diesels now in small airplanes.  A diesel engine is more efficient; let’s not use 
gasoline, so for prop airplanes, you can end up using diesel engines, which is 
interesting. You’d think they’d be too heavy, but they’re more efficient, so they 
save fuel. So it’s good from an economic standpoint.  I’m a little disappointed in 
NASA’s transitioning to space because a lot of people that we work with and the 
projects we worked with were involved with aeronautics in our atmosphere.  And 
they did a lot of good basic research that then would go into commercial.  Did a 
lot of the initial air foil work.  NACA, NACA was the original organization, 
developed a lot of the air foil shapes for efficiency.  That type of transition of 
products [for which] the government spends—you know it’s taxpayer money— 
does get back into the commercial sector; it just takes longer sometimes than 
others. No I’ve had a good career with doing what I wanted to do.  I started my 
company because I needed a job.  As I’ve mentioned, I’d worked ten years for 
Hydraulic Research.  We finished the B-47 program.  And I had an agreement 
with Hydraulic Research that if we didn’t get the next follow-on I could go back 
to Ohio State and finish up my doctorate course work, so I did that, and then 
decided that I didn’t want to go back to California, and I still have that same 
opinion; L.A. is not where I would want to live.  And I started my own company 
and it’s been very interesting, very productive.  And some of the stuff we did 
went somewhere.  And that’s always nice to be able to point and say “gee we did 
that.” It may look pretty crude and not terribly sophisticated now compared to 
what’s being done by the computer whiz-kids, but it was good time and it was a 
new era of technology so I enjoyed it.  The other aspects of the Wright Field 
compared to when we were there, the emphasis has changed; it’s less of a hands-
on technology. And I think if you can afford to do it, hands-on is still the best 
way to do it because if you want to go buy a system, you’ve played with it; you 
know whether it works and you have some judgment base to make a decision on 
what will work and what won’t.  As far as our activities, there’s less in-house 
activity now; there’s less test facility; they’ve shut wind tunnels down.  This is 
part of this budget and I expect some of the other people you’re talking to have a 
similar opinion that things have changed now.  There’s less hands-on, less 
facilities; there’s less innovation being conducted right at Wright Field.  And I 
think maybe that’s necessary; certainly there’s base closures and they have to stay 
in business. But it would not be for me as interesting a place to start over again 
and try to do the same thing; I wouldn’t be able to do it.  And I think that was one 
of the things with the government; the salaries weren’t high, the security was 
good. And you didn’t have to do something but if you wanted to you would not 
be stopped. [Laughs] It was a good place to work if you wanted to do something.  
And from a contractor’s stand point that was good for us as long as they could 
fund us because it was flexible; we were doing something useful, and we avoided 
some of the bureaucracy problems which you always have.  The administration 
changes; you get a new Colonel in the division that comes in and he’s there two 
years, and he wants to put his own footprint on the organization.  And we avoided 
that as being contractors. There was less of that trickling down to us.  So it was 
good. But I enjoyed it. We’d always—I’d kept the company at twelve.  Twelve 
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people was the highest; I’ve got eight right now.  And I work in the company; I 
don’t work on it. Which is from a business standpoint is the wrong thing, but I 
enjoy doing the engineering and I’m still active that way.   
00:29:07 Pasi: Well it seems to have worked for you.  Whatever you’re doing there.    
00:29:11 Jenney: Yeah I still get a paycheck.  [Laughs] 
00:29:13 Pasi: Working in or working on it is—it seems to have worked out.   
00:29:18 Jenney: No I have a good time.  As far as future’s concerned, certainly there’s an 
emphasis on the Air Force with the UAVS. And historically that was a—that 
became a problem.  One of the things that I see happening is that DARPA has 
been given the “far out” research projects to the lack of funding for the Air Force 
research. Now they’ll—a prime example of that was the UCAV, the U.C.A.V. 
which was funded to Boeing. But at that time there was about sixty million 
dollars for an annual budget that was just pulled out from Wright labs and taken 
away, and given to DARPA and DARPA went with UAV.  And in part at that 
time, and this is my impression; there was not a lot of enthusiasm within the 
Wright labs for piloted—or pilotless, uninhabited vehicles. And the UCAV was a 
viewed as a new way and if Wright labs had moved a little faster, been a little 
more responsive, they wouldn’t have had that funding pulled out and that made a 
big hit. That was part of the downsize.  But in terms of military development, 
now I think DARPA is probably doing most of it.   
00:30:54 Pasi: For laymen, DARPA 
00:30:56 Jenney: Defense Acquisition—you know they changed it a couple of times— 
Defense Acquisition Procurement Agency.  You’ll see them in the news. 
Programs funded by DARPA go over quite a wide range of projects, but certainly 
for the Air Force a lot of the research that DARPA is doing is directly related to 
what would normally be done by the Air Force.  So Wright labs is competing with 
them and actually they tend to, with some personnel, support the programs, the 
DARPA programs.  DARPA has the money; they ask for technical systems or 
technical managers, but it’s not an Air Force program anymore directly.  UCAVS, 
new actuations techniques, micro-actuators for small UAVS, that was funded 
through DARPA, not directed to the Air Force.  The other thing that happened in 
Wright labs is they—certainly from a flight dynamics standpoint and I’m perhaps 
rambling a little bit—they did a “Palace Knight” program which funded students 
to get their doctoral degrees with the idea that the Air Force would pay for it at a 
University, and then there was an obligation to spend at least four years after that 
to work in the labs. And it was the idea of getting increased technical talent.  
That’s worked pretty well in terms of getting people to sign up for it and getting 
them back into the system.  My perspective again is that what’s happened is that 
Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project Gavin D. Jenney 
in many cases the new graduate, Ph.D. get’s back into the laboratories and they 
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are immediately put into a management position as opposed to hands-on 
technical, so the advantage of what they’ve learned in college and the ability to 
apply it is not being exploited. And it could have been.  But that’s not the—that’s 
because of the lack of having in-house programs.  There’s not a lot of places they 
could be implemented and work.  So I think if you end up having a reduction in 
capability within the Air Force research organizations then it’s pretty much up to 
what the primes can do if given money—becomes the development pacing item
for new projects. I don’t know whether this has happened; I think this has 
happened in the same thing in the Propulsion Labs, the other labs, the Materials 
Lab; it’s almost across all the labs; there were cutbacks and a reduction in “what 
are the things that we should still be doing.”  Not enough money and then you get 
reduced capability, so pretty soon it’s doing less with less.  For awhile I think 
there’s a tendency to say “well we need to do more with less.”  But that’s wishful 
thinking. So it’s now less is going to be the output.  The new airplane the fixed-
wing, JSF or F-35 is probably the last one we’re going to see for a long time.   
00:34:41 	 Pasi: Is that that the Joint-Strike Fighter? 
00:34:42 	 Jenney: It’s the Joint-Strike Fighter.  It’s a Lockheed airplane.  We’re reduced— 
it’s the F-16 replacement [for] a lot of foreign customers, Spain, Britain, 
Netherlands. The idea though is that it would be an F-16 replacement and it’s got 
to be a budget thing.  And we now have a lot of competition from other countries; 
the Swedes have the Gripen. Britain has the European Fighter.  We’re seeing the 
same things in the cargo airplanes.  Airbus has something that looks very much 
like a C-17, so other countries are coming up to speed on an economic basis.  
We’re not the only players in many areas, UAVs the same thing and missiles.  
And then we still have the new fellow on the block, China, which is not where we 
are right now, but they have the resources to get there.  They’ve got people; 
they’ve got even the educational program.  They’re developing Ph.D.s at about 
ten times as fast as we are now.  So from an educational standpoint we’re, in the 
technical areas, we’re not producing the number of people that we need to make a 
leadership position feasible.  So we’re—we’ll eventually be an “also ran.”  And 
hopefully that will be awhile, but at least it’s potentially there.   
00:36:30 	 Pasi: Do you foresee a change to where we’ll get back to the government 
spending a lot of money on research and development within the Air Force itself,
or do you have to simply say “well that’s how it was, but that’s not how the future 
will go.” Or do you actually foresee a time and if so what will that take to get us 
back. 
00:36:50 	 Jenney: We need a threat; we respond to threats.  After something happens then 
we do something.  And this goes from the Civil War to World War I, it’s—you 
don’t anticipate. There are leaders that do anticipate, but they’re not listened to in 
terms of Churchill in Britain for example on how to treat Germany.  We need a 
threat. If China, or some other country, does exhibit the technical capability to be 
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a threat then I think we’ll respond.  We also are fighting this “terrorism” problem
and that’s a different game.  It’s a different, entirely different, scenario for 
weapons requirements, for surveillance, for how we deal with it.  And that’s a big 
expense. Our Homeland Security is a big expense.  So we’re going to have that 
drag on the discretionary funding for research.  So we’ll have research in that 
area, because that’s a continuing thing.  If another country like China gets parity 
in terms of where there weapons systems are on terms of either an offensive or 
defensive then we probably will start doing more in terms of putting money into 
research here. But it’s a going to be a budget balancing problem.  Perhaps, well 
will see where we are in ten years; it’ll take that long for the Chinese to I think 
come up to speed and be in a parity position.  They can outnumber us, but it’ll 
take a, certainly it’ll take a time period for them to develop.  They’re going 
through a learning process too. Some of it they buy; some of it they’re trying to 
develop. There’s an F-10 that they developed which is a model; looks very much 
like it was a knock off of an Israeli F-16 equivalent.  But it’s—they’re learning. 
India’s learning; they’ve got a light combat fighter also.  In terms of the UAVs, 
I’m not familiar with what all the things that we’re doing and certainly some of 
the things that the foreign countries, but they’re pursuing uninhabited vehicles as 
vigorously as we are. 
00:39:32	 Pasi: Again that does give you a reality check of the threat that existed from 1945 
to 1992, these things don’t go away. There’s always— 
00:39:43 	 Jenney: No they don’t. 
00:39:44 	 Pasi: There’s always a vacuum there to be filled and someone there to take its 
place. 
00:39:55 	 Jenney: Yes, Yes pretty much.  As far as our educational system—I could wander 
off into several areas—but as far as our educational system, the emphasis in 
science technology, it’s been recognized that we need to do more.  There’s a 
STEM program; Wright State’s involved with that in terms of encouraging people 
to enter the technological areas because we are anticipating a gap, or have a gap.  
Engineering I always thought, even though I did it, I thought it was a hard 
program compared to other programs. Business was I thought easier to get 
through. And generally if you flunked out of engineering you could always go 
into business, [Laughs] back in my undergraduate days.  But the need for 
developing technology and the people to be able to deal with it, and certainly the 
tools for engineering, computers, tools, materials, all those things, can be 
exploited for both military and commercial use.  But we need to have people 
trained and educated to be able to do that.  And we’re not graduating enough of 
those; nor are people entering colleges in—as a good substantial number entering 
that type of program.  The university has recognized that and it’ll be I think a long 
term goal to try to increase the science and technology part of the student 
population. And it does have a payoff. You know it’s not all being able to handle 
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finance or be able to—literature, arts; there’s a very definite payoff to society in 
general with the technology development.  Military was one application of it. The 
energy independence is another one that we’re going to need; we do need to wean 
us of dependence on the foreign oil. So all those activities in the science area that 
can benefit the country in general also benefitted the military and it’s a case of we 
need more engineers.   
00:42:40 	 Pasi: This might be a good time to again thank you for taking some time out of 
your schedule and be with us today and thanks for being a part of this project.   
00:42:52 	 Jenney: Alright thank you.  I enjoyed it. [Laughs] 
End of Videotape 2 
End of Interview 
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